

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Nov 1 11 39 PM '62

EYES ONLY

ACTION: USUN, New York NIACT 1166 EYES ONLY

INFO: US Mission GENEVA 740

SUBJECT: New York Negotiations on Cuba.

Re Cuba (URTEL 1586), understand from telecon ICRC inspection process on high seas ~~that~~ ⁰¹³ ~~that~~ can be started soonest. We hope, therefore, that ICRC, as executive agent of UN, can begin inspection process forthwith, Subject to views USUN and negotiating group, ~~we~~ ^{we} believe following steps can be taken by Thant and his staff with a view to getting ICRC inspectors into action soonest.

1. Believe UN should ask ICRC immediately to ^{one or more} name/high-level individuals as they desire / to come to NY ~~immediately~~ to establish contact and liaison with Secretariat

with a view to working out practical arrangements. (Please inform Dept soonest names such ICRC reps.) ^{such} ~~that~~

2. UN, even before ICRC names/individuals and sends ~~them~~ ^{them} to NY, should through its Geneva office urge ICRC to begin recruitment of small group of inspectors (about 50) qualified to perform inspection ~~of weapons~~ ^{of weapons} covered by this agreement. ~~ICRC should be asked to begin recruitment of small group of inspectors (about 50) qualified to perform inspection of weapons covered by this agreement.~~

3. We note that Narasimhan thinking tentatively in terms neutral vessels. ^{since} We prefer American vessels be used at least in first instance ~~since~~ ^{they are} ~~most readily available.~~ ^{FTI} Moreover, this more desirable from our viewpoint ^{END FTI} since ~~news~~ ^{news} and communications systems fully reliable. / You should take this line with Narasimhan and Soviets at first.

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By

1009 NARS, Date 5/1/01

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FII. We recognize that it may not be possible to get agreement to use of American bottoms, although we would seek to minimize any political difficulty by offering ships which are not under US military jurisdiction, i.e., Coast Guard, merchant or Geodetic Survey ships. At same time, we are exploring on priority basis possible availability in or close to Caribbean area of neutral ships which might be used for purposes. ~~These ships should be of a type which is not subject to the same kind of political difficulties as the US ships. However, you should not initially indicate this either to Morozov or Narasimhan.~~

Re financing UN inspection operation, as indicated Deptel 1147, we prefer that if UN is to foot bill, financing be provided under Section 1(a) of 1961 General Assembly Resolution authorizing SVG make commitments not exceeding 2 million dollars as he certifies related to maintenance peace and security.

Narasimhan's suggestion ICRC assess its members not feasible because ICRC does not have membership which it can ~~xxx~~ assess, but comprises committee of Swiss ~~businessmen~~ nationals. Normally ICRC expenses are advanced or ~~the committee of members would be prepared to make good of appropriate~~ ~~expenses of the committee of members of the ICRC~~ reimbursed by interested parties who seek their services for special projects. Soviets are familiar with ICRC financing. Therefore, particularly since they suggested ICRC participation, see no reason why they should object contribute towards ICRC expenses.

As to costs of vessels, US would be prepared to make appropriate US ships available on non-reimbursable basis.

Defense

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Defense has ~~suggested~~ ^{developed} following verification procedures:

1. There would be established on the high seas two check stations:
 - a. One station ship in the vicinity of Havana;
 - b. One station ship in the vicinity of the windward passage.
2. With respect to the above-mentioned ships, the Soviet Government would give UN Headquarters in New York timely notice of those enroute to Cuba, together with a description of their cargoes.
3. All such ships would be instructed by the Soviet Union to establish communications with ~~the~~ appropriate station ship on 500 KC when within 500 miles of ~~the~~ check station. When communications are established, ~~the~~ incoming ship would give its name, position, course, speed, estimated time of arrival at check station, and port of destination. The incoming ships would maintain communications with the UN station ship on a radio watch schedule and frequency arranged with that station ship.
4. Rendezvous time and position would be signaled to ~~the~~ incoming ship by ~~the~~ UN inspector on board ~~the~~ station ship.
5. The incoming ship would be prepared to receive UN inspectors on arrival at ~~the~~ rendezvous. ~~The~~ Incoming ship would facilitate such inspection of ~~the~~ vessel and cargo as ~~the~~ inspectors consider necessary by opening hatches, holds, and spaces, and by having all papers readily available.
Each
6. ~~The~~ UN inspection team would consist of approximately eight persons, who would be IURC personnel.
7. ~~The~~ UN would request all nations carrying cargo to Cuba from bloc ports to comply with the above procedures.

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8. If any ship is found to be carrying offensive weapons, as listed in the Presidential Proclamation of October 23, 1962, the UN inspectors would immediately notify SYG, who we would expect to notify us of this fact.

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